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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PETTY MOTOR LEASE, INC., 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
CLARENCE L. JOLLEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
By its amended complaint (R. 2-9), the plaintiff 
alleged that on or about the 24th day of June, 1971, 
Defendant entered into three lease agreements with the 
Plaintiff, by which the Plaintiff leased to the Defendant 
three automobiles, rental payments to be made on a monthly 
basis. Plaintiff also alleged that on or about the 24th 
day of June, 1971, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into 
another contract by which Defendant agreed to purchase 
the three automobiles for the sum of $10,000.00 after the 
expiration of one year. Plaintiff also alleged that under 
the contract, Defendant assigned to Plaintiff certain 
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shares of stock, and that Defendant agreed to have the 
stock made free trading on or before the one year expira-
tion date, at which time the Plaintiff would be able to 
sell the shares. The Plaintiff also alleged that the 
contract provided that when the stock was sold, the 
Plaintiff would apply the proceeds of the sale to the 
rental due under the terms of the leases and the balance 
toward the purchase price. Plaintiff also alleged that 
in the event the sale price of the securities was less 
than the amount required to pay the lease and to complete 
the purchase price, the Defendant had the option to pay 
the balance and obtain title to the automobiles or return 
the cars to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff alleged that the 
Plaintiff was entitled to the excess of the proceeds of 
the sale, if any. Finally, the Plaintiff alleged that the 
Defendant had breached the contract in that Defendant had 
not made the stock free trading. 
By his answer and counterclaim and affirmative 
defense (R. 10-13), the Defendant admitted that the 
Defendant and Plaintiff had entered into the tnree leases 
and a sales contract. As an affirmative defense, the 
Defendant alleged that the Plaintiff was estopped from 
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asserting breach of contract because the Plaintiff volun-
tarily took upon itself the responsibility to free up 
the stock, leading the Defendant to believe that he had 
no further obligation under the contract, and thereby 
waiving the provision in the contract requiring the 
Defendant to free up the stock. The Defendant in his 
prayer requested that the court give to the Defendant 
clear and free title to the three automobiles, and that 
the Court grant to the Defendant all sums which Plaintiff 
could have obtained had it diligently and properly pursued 
the freeing up of the stock, in excess of the purchase 
price of the automobiles. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter came up for trial before the Honorable 
Earnest F. Baldwin on May 6, 1977. After the trial, the 
Court awarded the Plaintiff judgment in the amount of 
$10,608.55, and dismissed the Defendant's counterclaim 
with prejudice. (R. 41-42) In its findings of fact, the 
trial court found that the Defendant did not register 
the shares of stock, did not receive an opinion 
from company counsel that registration was not required, 
and did not otherwise make the stock freely tradeable 
-~ 
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as required by the contract (R. 39). From this finding 
of fact, the court concluded that the Defendant had breached 
the contract with the Plaintiff. (R. 39) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks the following relief on appeal: 
1. A determination by the Court that a finding 
of fact should be entered that the Plaintiff voluntarily 
took upon itself the obligation to free up the stock, 
leading the Defendant to reasonably believe that he no 
longer had any responsibility under the agreement, and that 
the Defendant relied thereon, reasonably believing that the 
Plaintiff would free up the stock itself. 
2. A determination by the Court that because of 
the Plaintiff's actions in taking upon itself the responsi-
bility of freeing up the stock, the Plaintiff waived the 
Defendant's obligation under the contract, and that the 
Plaintiff should be estopped from asserting that the 
Defendant breached the contract for failure to free up the 
stock. 
3. A determination by the Court that the trial 
court committed error in allowing the Plaintiff's expert 
witnesses to testify concerning whether the stock could be 
l 
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freed up, while refusing to allow the Defendant's expert 
witness to testify on the same matter. 
4. A determination by the Court that the trial 
court applied erroneous law in regard to freeing up of 
stock during the course and proceedings of the trial and 
that its findings of fact and conclusions of law were 
prejudiced thereby. 
5. As an alternative to the relief requested in 
paragraphs number 1 and 2, a determination by the Court that 
a new trial be granted because of the reversible errors 
committed by the trial court as described in paragraphs 
numbers 3 - 4. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. At the trial, the Defendant testified that he had 
a telephone conversation with Newman Petty, President of 
the Plaintiff Corporation, and that during the course of 
the conversation, Mr. Petty told him that he would prefer 
to have his own attorney provide an opinion in regard to 
freeing up the stock and that Defendant replied that this 
arrangement would be fine with him. (Transcript 69.) 
Graham Dodd, a Salt Lake Attorney, testified that the 
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Defendant had come to him, requesting that he free up the 
stock. Mr. Dodd testified that he started to do research 
on the problem, but after two or three weeks received a 
phone call from the Defendant requesting that he spend no 
more time on the problem because Mr. Petty had decided to 
retain his own lawyer to issue an opinion to free up the 
stock. (Transcript 64.) 
2. At the trial, there was exhaustive evidence 
that the Plaintiff went to extensive effort to free up the 
stock by itself: 
a. Mr. Petty testified that before May or June 
of 1973, he contacted Thomas Blomquist, Counsel for the 
Corporation which had issued the stock, and talked to him 
several times about the freeing up of the stock. During 
the course of their conversations, Mr. Blomquist suggested 
that Mr. Petty call a certain attorney in California and 
ask him about the freeing up of the stock. (Transcript 
13 - 14.) 
b. Mr. Petty testified that he called this 
attorney in California, but was told that the attorney 
would object to freeing up the stock and would not give a 
letter of recommendation on it. (Transcript 14.) 
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c. Mr. Petty testified that after his communi-
cation with the attorney in California, he contacted 
Richard Byrd, a Salt Lake Attorney, requesting that Mr. 
Byrd undertake to free up the stock, and that Mr. Byrd 
subsequently investigated the matter. (Transcript 14.) 
d. Mr. Petty testified that he had at least 
two more conversations with Mr. Blomquist, asking him to 
do whatever was necessary to free up the stock, but that 
Mr. Blomquist had told him that it couldn't be done and 
that the company would object to it. (Transcript 15.) 
e. Richard Byrd testified that he was con-
tacted by Mr. Petty who requested him to free up the stock. 
Mr. Byrd testified that Mr. Petty provided him with copies 
of the stock certificates, and sent him a letter including 
copies of the agreements entered into between the Plaintiff 
and the Defendant. Mr. Byrd also testified that he had had 
various conversations and communications with Mr. Petty 
in regard to the freeing up of the stock. (Transcript 
28 - 31.) 
f. Thomas Blomquist, Attorney for the company 
which issued the stock, teqtified that Mr. Petty had con-
tacted him, requesting his opinion as to whether the stock 
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could be freed up. (Transcript 43.) 
3. The contract specified that the Defendant was 
to have the stock freed up by June 23, 1972. (Exhibits 
1-P, 1-P (A), 1-P (B), 1-P (C)) . 
4. Mr. Petty testified that he was busy trying to 
get the stock freed up himself as late as May or June of 
1973. (Transcript 13.) 
5. Mr. Petty testified that he had had several 
conversations with the Defendant wherein Mr. Petty expressed 
his concern bec~use the stock had not been freed up. Mr. 
Petty testified that he told the Defendant that it was the 
Defendant's responsibility to free up the stock. (Transcript 
12 - 13.) 
6. At the trial, Mr. Richard Byrd, a Salt Lake 
attorney, was called as a witness by the Plaintiff and was 
allowed to testify concerning whether the stock could have 
been freed up. (Transcript 29 - 30.) 
7. At the trial, Mr. Thomas Blomquist, an attorney, 
was called as a witness by the Plaintiff and was allowed to 
testify as to the law of freeing up of stock, expressing his 
opinion to the court that the stock could not have been 
freed up. (Transcript 48 - 50.) Counsel for the Defendant 
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made strenuou3 objection to the introduction of this 
evidence. (Transcript 45 - 47.) 
8. After the testimony of Thomas Blomquist, the 
court made the comment that " .... it is crystal clear to 
me this stock was not and could not at this stage become 
free trading." (Transcript 53.) 
9. At the trial, Counsel for the Defendant called 
to the witness stand, Graham Dodd, a Salt Lake Attorney, fo 
ask his opinion as to whether the stock could have been 
freed up. (Transcript 64.) At this point, the Attorney 
for the Plaintiff objected to the introduction of this 
evidence on the ground that it was irrelevant because 
" .•.. the restrictive legend in the certificate requires 
an opinion of corporate counsel, not of some independent 
attorney." (Transcript 64.) The Court sustained the ob-
jection without comment. (Transcript 64.) The Attorney 
for the Defendant then made an offer of proof that Mr. 
Dodd would have testified that he could have issued an 
opinion that the stock could have been freed up. 
cript 65.) 
(Trans-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE IS NOT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT, AND THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN NOT ENTERING A FINDING OF FACT THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF TOOK UPON HIMSELF THE OBLIGATION TO FREE-
UP THE STOCK, LEADING THE DEFENDANT TO REASONABLY 
BELIEVE THAT HE NO LONGER HAD ANY RESPONSIBILITY 
UNDER THE AGREEMENT, AND THAT THE DEFENDANT RELIED 
THEREON, REASONABLY BELIEVING THAT PLAINTIFF WOULD 
FREE UP THE STOCK ITSELF: 
The basic rule of appellate review is that a presump-
tion arises that the judgment is sound, and the appellate 
court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prevailing party. Branel v. Utah State Road Commission, 
465 P.2d 534 (Utah, 1970); Rivas v Pacific Finance Company, 
397 P.2d 990 (Utah, 1964). However, under some circumstances 
this presumption can be overcome. In Hardy v. Hendrickson, 
495 P.2d 28, 29, this Court stated: 
On appeal the evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to sustain the lower court, and the find-
ings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly 
against the weight of the evidence ..•. 
Also, in Branel, supra at 535-536, this Court stated: 
The Foundational Rule on this aspect of procedure 
is that it is the trial judge's prerogative to find 
the facts; and this includes judging the credibility 
of the witnesses and the evidence and drawing whatever 
reasonable inferences may fairly be derived therefrom. 
It is therefor more accurate to say that on review we 
survey the evidence in the light favorable to the 
findings, whichever party they may favor; and that 
they will not be disturbed on appeal if they are 
supported by substantial evidence. 
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It is apparent from the foregoing rules of law that 
the Supreme Court of Utah will find a trial courts finding 
of facts to be erroneous if it can be shown that the weight 
of evidence is clearly against the findings; or if it can 
be shown that there is no substantial evidence to support 
them. In the instant case, a survey of the record indicates 
that the weight of evidence is clearly against the findings 
of fact, and that in relationship to the weight of the 
evidence, there is no substantial evidence to support the 
findings of fact the way they presently stand. 
The vast weight of the evidence clearly shows that 
the Plaintiff took upon himself the obligation and the 
responsibility to free up the stock and that the Defendant 
relied upon this assumption of responsibility on the part 
of the Plaintiff, and thereafter reasonably believed that 
his obligation under the contract to free up the stock had 
been extinguished. The Defendant testified that Newman 
Petty, President of the Plaintiff Corporation, specifically 
told him that he would assume this responsibility. Graham 
Dodd, a Salt Lake attorney, testified that the Defendant 
came to him, requesting that he endeavor to free up the 
stock, but that subsequently the Defendant requested that 
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he discontinue his work on the problem for the reason 
that Mr. Petty had decided to retain his own lawyer to 
issue an opinion to free up the stock. There was ex-
haustive evidence during the course of the trial that 
the Plaintiff went to extensive effort ~o free up the 
stock by itself. The evidence showed that Mr. Petty con-
tacted three different lawyers in regard to the matter 
and had many communications and conversations with each 
attorney. One of the attorneys, Richard Byrd, verified 
the fact that the Plaintiff was busy trying to free up 
the stock itself by testifying that Mr. Petty came to him 
with stock certificates and copies of various documents 
requesting that he help him free up the stock. Another 
attorney, Thomas Blomquist, testified that Mr. Petty con-
tacted him many times in regard to the matter. The only 
evidence whatsoever in the record that contradicts the 
above evidence is the uncorroborated testimony of Mr. 
Petty that he told the Defendant that it was his responsi-
bility to free up the stock. In light of the great weight 
of evidence showing that the Plaintiff had assumed the 
responsibility to free up the stock, it cannot be said 
that this uncorroborated testimony by Mr. Petty is sub-
stantial evidence to support the findings of fact by the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-13-
trial court. 
It is true, of course, that it is the trial court's 
prerogative to judge the credibility of witnesses, and 
the Appellate Court is usually bound by the trial court's 
determination of the issue of credibility. Thus, it might 
be argued that the trial court simply decided that the 
testimony in favor of the Defendant's position was not 
credible, and that the testimony in favor of the Plaintiff 
was credible. However, if this position is accepted by 
the instant Court, then a serious problem arises. This is 
because Mr. Petty's testimony is contradictory in and of 
itself. First of all, Mr. Petty testified that he specifi-
cally told the Defendant that it was his responsibility to 
free up the stock. Then, subsequently, Mr. Petty elaborately 
described the many efforts that he underwent himself to free 
up the stock. Thus, Mr. Petty's testimony as to the exten-
sive efforts he underwent to free up the stock, clearly 
belies his testimony that he had not assumed the responsi-
bility for freeing up the stock. The findings of fact, there-
fore, must be based on a very curious determination of 
credibility by the trial court. The trial court must have 
determined that Mr. Petty was telling the truth insofar as 
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his testimony related to his allegation that he had not 
assumed the responsibility for freeing up the stock, but 
disbelieved his testimony insofar as it related to the 
extensive efforts undergone by himself to free up the 
stock. Thus, the trial court's determination of this issue 
is specious at best. Because of this irregularity, it 
cannot be said that the findings of fact are "supported 
by substantial evidence", and it is apparent that the 
findings of fact are "clearly against the weight of evi-
dence." 
POINT II. 
UNDER UTAH LAW, A PARTY TO A CONTRACT, THROUGH HIS 
WORDS, ACTS, OR CONDUCT, CAN EFFECTIVELY WAIVE AN 
OBLIGATION UNDER THE CONTRACT OWED TO HIM BY THE 
OTHER PARTY. 
This Court, in Davis v. Payne and Day, Inc., 348 
P. 2d 337, 339 (Utah, 1960), stated: 
It is a well established rule of law that parties 
to a written contract may modify, waive, or make 
new terms notwithstanding terms in the contract 
designed to hamper such freedom. 
The Court, in articulating this rule of law, stated 
in Calhoun v. Universal Credit Company, 146 P. 2d 284, 287 
(Utah, 1944): 
Where one by his conduct has caused the other to 
believe that he has waived a provision which was 
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placed there for his benefit, and considers the 
contract in full force and effect, common honesty 
between men requires that, if he subsequently 
desires to enforce the provision, reasonable time 
must be given the other party to comply with the 
terms of the contract. 
It is apparent from the foregoing language by the 
Supreme Court of Utah that the principal of waiver applies 
in the contract situation, and that a party may waive a 
provision in a contract which was for his benefit. In the 
instant case, it is apparent that the Plaintiff waived the 
provision in the contract requiring the defendant to free 
up the stock within a year after the three lease agreements 
were entered into, taking upon itself the responsibility to 
do so. Three things lead to this conclusion. First, the 
evidence at the trial showed that Mr. Petty himself went to 
exhaustive and extensive efforts to free up the stock. 
Secondly, the Defendant testified that Plaintiff released him 
from the obligation. Thirdly, Mr. Petty obviously had waived 
the provision in the contract, because even as late as one 
year after the date upon which Defendant's "obligation" to 
free up the stock had matured, Mr. Petty was still busy talk-
ing to attorneys and trying to get the stock freed up himself. 
The Plaintiff, therefore, cannot now complain that the 
Defendant failed to execute this term of the contract, and 
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the Plaintiff should be estopped from asserting breach of 
contract. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
ALLOWING THE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESSES TO TESTIFY 
CONCERNING WHETHER THE STOCK COULD HAVE BEEN MADE 
FREELY TRADEABLE, WHILE NOT ALLOWING THE DEFENDANT'S 
EXPERT WITNESS TO TESTIFY ON THE SAME MATTER. 
At the trial, the court allowed the Plaintiff to 
introduce evidence concerning whether the stock could have 
been made freely tradeable. Richard Byrd, a Salt Lake 
attorney, testified concerning this matter and Thomas 
Blomquist, despite objections of the Defendant, was allowed 
to give his opinion that the stock could not have been 
freed up. The court refused to allow the Defendant's 
witness, Graham Dodd, a Salt Lake attorney, to give his 
opinion that the stock could have been freed up. 
This appears to have been an abuse of judicial 
discretion, since the question of whether stock may become 
freely tradeable is a question of fact. A corporation's 
refusal to free up stock may be wrongful depending upon the 
facts of the case. See Melville v. wantschek, 403 F.Supp. 
439 (E.D.N.Y., 1975); Travis Investment Co. v. Harwyn 
Publishing Corporation, 288 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y., 1968). 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-17-
In Travis Investment Co., supra at 527, the court recognized 
that refusal to transfer certificates without justification 
was wrongful: 
Therefore, plaintiff has not proved that Harwyn's 
refusal to transfer the shares was wrongful and in 
violation of its duty to plaintiff; and Harwyn 
has established that its refusal to transfer the 
shares ... was reasonable. 
After the testimony of Mr. Blomquist was concluded, 
the court then made the comment: "I think it is crystal 
clear to me this stock was not and could not at this 
stage become free trading." Obviously, the court's 
conclusion was unjustified because it had not allowed 
the Defendant's witness to testify on this matter. 
The court's conclusion also was prejudicial because 
the outcome of the case could have been conceivably 
different if the court would have believed that the stock 
could have been made freely tradeable. It is evident 
that if the court believed that the stock could not have 
been freed up, then the question of waiver on the part of 
plaintiff would not have been relevant to the 
court's consideration. Thus, the court might have 
disregarded competent evidence on the question of waiver 
and estoppel simply because it did not feel it relevant. 
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The foregoing is respectfully submitted. 
LORIN N. PACE 
RANDALL BUNNELL 
431 South Third East, B-1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
I certify that I mailed two (2) copies of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT to Wayne G. Petty of Moyle 
and Draper, 600 Deseret Plaza, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent, this 23d day of 
January 1978, postage prepaid. 
RANDALL BUNNELL 
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